Neoliberalism and East Asia: Resisting the Washington Consensus by Beeson, Mark & Islam, Iyanatul
 1
Neoliberalism and East Asia: Resisting the Washington Consensus 
 
Mark Beeson and Iyanatul Islam  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the way neoliberal ideas have been promoted and resisted in East 
Asia. The core argument of this paper is that the contest of ideas in economic policy-
making can evolve independently of their intellectual merit and empirical credibility. 
Political interests shape and mediate the process. In the case of post-crisis East Asia, the 
notion that the political economies of the region need to be fundamentally reformed to 
re-ignite the ‘economic miracle’ of the pre-crisis era does not stem from a politically 
neutral, dispassionate and intellectually rigorous analyses of what went wrong in the 
recession-inducing 1997 financial crisis that engulfed the region. It represents an 
attempt to re-invent orthodoxy in the domain of economic ideas and ideology by the 
global policy community that in turn bears the inordinate influence of US-centric 
institutions. 
 
 
Current debates over the future direction of the reform agenda in post-crisis East Asia 
have to be set in the broader context of the global debate on the role of ideas and 
ideology in shaping economic policy-making. Certain ideas gain primacy at one stage 
and seem to fade at another juncture. The core argument of this paper is that the 
contest of ideas in economic policy-making can evolve independently of their 
intellectual merit and empirical credibility. Political interests shape and mediate the 
process. In the case of post-crisis East Asia, the notion that the political economies of 
the region need to be fundamentally reformed to re-ignite the ‘economic miracle’ of 
the pre-crisis era does not stem from a politically neutral, dispassionate and 
intellectually rigorous analyses of what went wrong in the recession-inducing 1997 
financial crisis that engulfed the region. It represents an attempt to re-invent 
orthodoxy in the domain of economic ideas and ideology by the global policy 
community that in turn bears the inordinate influence of US-centric institutions.  
 
This proposition is developed in a number of ways. First, the paper delineates the 
conservative economic and political agenda of what is often called neoliberalism. The 
latter preaches the primacy of the market economy in engendering and sustaining 
economic prosperity. In propagating such a view, it poses a direct challenge to the 
values and ethos of ‘regulated capitalism’ that held sway in the industrialised 
countries of the OECD for at least two decades after the Second World War. The 
ascendency of conservative political forces towards the end of the 1970s in the United 
States and the United Kingdom undoubtedly played a role in the intellectual 
ascendency of neoliberalism.  
 
The 1980s and 1990s cemented the rise of neoliberalism even as a professional 
consensus appeared to emerge that markets alone could not explain rapid East Asian 
economic growth in the pre-crisis era and that institutional variables played an 
important, and perhaps even a decisive, role. As Chomsky (1993) argues, the end of 
the Cold War unleashed the hegemonic impulse of the United States, while the onset 
of the long economic boom in the 1990s under the Clinton administration lent a 
degree of legitimacy to a global project of ‘exporting’ neoliberal ideas to the rest of 
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the world. The Bretton Woods institutions – represented by the Washington-based 
World Bank and the IMF – turned out to be the principal conduit for the transmission 
of neoliberal ideas to the developing countries. Williamson (1990, 1994) became 
famous for celebrating this proselytising role of the Bank and the IMF. He suggested 
that these institutions, in conjunction with the US Treasury, represented the 
‘Washington consensus’ on what constituted ‘good’ economic policies. The 
Washington Consensus eventually became a global policy mantra. Yet, the legitimacy 
of the Washington Consensus is now being questioned.  
 
Several factors and events have combined to force a re-thinking of the original tenets 
of neoliberalism. These include the perceived mishandling of the East Asian crisis by 
the Bretton Woods institutions. The termination of the long economic boom of the 
1990s in the United States and a series of corporate scandals that has tarnished the 
image of American capitalism also dented the potency of a US-led global project to 
propagate neoliberalism across the world.1 The tragedy of ‘fast-tracking’ capitalism in 
Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union, the failure of the neoliberal experiment in 
Latin America and the highly circumspect nature of the evidence on global growth, 
inequality and poverty have turned out to be influential in restraining the rise of 
neoliberalism.2 What one is witnessing is a re-invention of global neoliberalism under 
the guise of an ‘augmented Washington consensus’.  
 
The paper counsels caution in embracing this modified version of global 
neoliberalism, even if domestic political forces in East Asia turn out to be receptive to 
the adoption of such ideas. It suggests that elements of the pre-crisis East Asian 
development strategy still has contemporary relevance, while new – and more 
assertive – forms of regional cooperation that has emerged in the wake of the 1997 
crisis deserve greater attention. At the same time, an enabling global environment is 
crucial in supporting national policy initiatives in post-crisis East Asia. 
 
The evolution of neoliberalism 
 
As noted, neoliberalism preaches the primacy of a market economy (combined with a 
limited role of the government) in engendering and sustaining economic prosperity – 
a proposition that is supposed to be valid across both time and space. Not surprisingly, 
some commentators, such as Stiglitz (2002) and Soros (1998), use the term ‘market 
fundamentalism’ as a synonym for neoliberalism. The latter also espouses a 
conservative political agenda in which the political leadership should attenuate the 
activism of civil society and allow technocrats the discretion, freedom and scope to 
pursue the neoliberal economic agenda. This stems from a world-view in which rent-
seeking lobbyists, keen on acquiring special privileges and protection from the 
government, populate society.  
 
Neoliberals display an aversion to significant government intervention in a market 
economy. They adhere to an analytical framework in which government activism is 
either a reflection of the innate predatory instincts of the state or the basis for creating 
opportunities for rent-seeking interests to emerge that ultimately ‘capture’ the policy-
making process to suit their partisan ends.3  
 
Neoliberalism marks a significant departure from the ideas and ideology that guided 
the international order that emerged in the wake of the Second World War. The 
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structures of liberal governance created primarily under United States auspices in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II provided an overarching geopolitical and 
regulatory framework within which capitalism flourished. Crucially, however, as 
Ruggie [1982: 379-415] famously pointed out, despite the increasingly pervasive 
influence and reach of the so-called Bretton Woods institutions that were established 
at this time, the emergent liberal order was premised on the retention of a high degree 
of domestic autonomy. State intervention in the market economy to attain specific 
economic ends (most notably full employment) was widely regarded as a legitimate 
political aspiration. The compromise of ‘embedded liberalism’ meant that individual 
governments retained a good deal of independence in the management of the domestic 
economy, something that led to very different patterns of political relationships and 
economic structures. The Cold War environment, which provided a compelling 
strategic impetus for capitalist consolidation, not only provided a conducive 
environment for the successful resurrection of liberal capitalism generally [Latham 
1997], it also facilitated the development of very different types of capitalism that 
persist to this day [Berger and Dore 1996; Coates 2000].  
 
In the first couple of decades after World War II, the so-called ‘golden age’ of 
capitalism [Glyn 1990: 39-119], Keynesian policies were the accepted orthodoxy and 
dominant policy paradigm. Across the capitalist world, ‘interventionist’ macro-
economic policy was considered a necessary part of responsible economic 
management. A number of factors helped undermine the pre-eminent position of 
Keynesian ideas and pave the way for a transition initially to monetarism and 
subsequently to a more broadly based neoliberal agenda. First, the breakdown of the 
managed system of exchange rates associated with the original Bretton Woods 
agreements and the subsequent exponential growth of financial markets meant that 
domestic policy-making autonomy had been undermined. Second, a series of 
interconnected economic crises in the 1970s revolving around the inflationary impact 
of rising oil process, a fiscal crisis of the state, and rising unemployment, led many to 
consider the Keynesian model to be exhausted and no longer appropriate. Over time, a 
great deal of emphasis was placed on fighting inflation as the core responsibility of 
governments, while the need to sustain full employment was no longer regarded as an 
explicit macroeconomic policy goal. It was argued that, once stable prices prevailed, a 
market economy had self-correcting properties and did not require Keynesian 
activism to cure recessions. 
 
Neoliberalism was enthusiastically and effectively promoted by an influential group 
of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ who were ultimately able to obtain the formidable political 
support of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the US [Crockett 
1994]. The combination of seemingly ineffective Keynesian policies and an 
enthusiastically supported alternative model meant that the preconditions for a 
fundamental paradigm shift were in place. Crucially, however, as Peter Hall has 
pointed out [1993: 275-96; 1986], it required the application of political power to 
overcome the institutionalised obstacles to reform that threatened to block the 
transition to a new ruling economic orthodoxy. 
 
In much of East Asia, not only is the support for a similar paradigm shift and 
wholesale embrace of neoliberalism generally less evident, but potential obstacles to 
reform remain entrenched. As a number of observers have pointed out [Beeson 2002: 
7-27; Hall 1986; Zysman 1994: 243-83], ‘history matters’, because the historically 
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specific circumstances within which policy is constructed and applied necessarily 
delimit what is acceptable and feasible.4 Even if it could be demonstrated that 
neoliberal policies are in some way ‘better’ or more appropriate than the state-led 
economic policies that have been the norm across much of East Asia – and, as we 
shall see, this is highly unlikely – such policy initiatives will not be taken up in the 
absence of adequate political backing. Given that much of the neoliberal agenda 
directly threatens existing patterns of political and economic power across much of 
the region, there is no reason to suppose that neoliberal policies will be 
enthusiastically taken up – especially if there are continuing doubts about the merits 
and possible impact of the neoliberal paradigm. Before considering the basis of such 
reservations, it is important to briefly spell out how the neoliberal model was 
‘exported’ to the rest of the world under the guise of the Washington consensus and 
how this global project has undergone significant modifications. 
 
Neoliberalism and the Washington consensus 
 
The diffuse array of ideas associated with neoliberalism was given more precise 
expression by John Williamson [1994: 11-28] who termed the expression Washington 
consensus to describe the economic orthodoxy that prevailed in the US Treasury 
Department and in key IFIs like the World Bank and the IMF. Much of what 
Williamson described as ‘the technocrats agenda’ became the familiar staples of 
contemporary policy-making – amongst the Anglo-American economies at least.   
 
The original Washington consensus, which Williamson described as the ‘common 
core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists’ consists of the first 10 points 
outlined in Table 1. Much of this has become the widely recognised bedrock of the 
market-oriented reform agenda that emerged in Britain and America during the 1980s. 
The ‘ten commandments’ in Table 1 are meant to roll back the reach of the state. 
Thus, governments, in both rich and poor nations, are urged to practice 
‘macroeconomic prudence’ (a euphemism for the control of inflation and for 
maintaining tight budgets), deregulation, privatisation and economic liberalisation 
(primarily through both trade and capital account liberalisation). There are, of course, 
references to restructuring government budgetary priorities for sustaining social 
spending in basic health and education, but, as Williamson (1999) himself concedes, 
this proposition is typically neglected in practice.5 
 
 
The Washington Consensus has, in recent years, mutated into the ‘augmented-
Washington Consensus’ [AWC], in which the original agenda has been supplemented 
by a concern with poverty reduction and a range of ‘governance’ issues, outlined in 
points 11-20 in Table 1.6 The pre-requisites of ‘good’ governance revolve around 
democratic reform, the promotion of civil society, institution and capacity building, 
transparency, a renewed commitment to poverty reduction, and the creation of social 
safety nets. It is clear that the emphasis on the promotion of civil society in the 
‘augmented’ version of the Washington consensus represents a significant attempt to 
differentiate itself from the original neoliberal political agenda of restraining the 
activism of civil society on the ground that the latter is populated by rent-seeking 
lobbyists.  
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The initial mishandling of the East Asian crisis by the IMF, and the failure of a 
predicted ‘V-shaped’ recovery from the recessions that followed in the wake of the 
1997 financial crisis, has had the effect of accelerating the consolidation of an AWC.  
In general, earlier certainties about the wisdom of financial sector reform that was a 
core plank of IMF-led rescue efforts in East Asia are being subjected to widespread 
critiques [Jayasuriya and Rosser 2001: 381-96]. Yet, despite this apparent willingness 
to consider the circumstances within which reform occurs, there is little recognition of 
the politically contested nature of the economic reform process. As Higgott [2000: 
131-53] observes, ‘to the extent that the international institutions recognise that 
political resistance is a legitimate part of the governance equation, it is a problem to 
be solved. It is not seen as a perpetual part of the process’ [Higgott 2000: 144, 
emphasis in original]. 
 
Re-inventing neoliberalism in East Asia 
 
Despite the failure of the Washington consensus to recognise the inherently political 
nature of reform, a crucial question is whether the East Asian crisis is in fact a 
vindication of the basic tenets of the neoliberal reform agenda. If so, does this mean 
that post-crisis East Asia will have to embrace these tenets as a means of re-igniting 
the ‘miracle’ years of the pre-1997 period? This section of the paper suggests that, far 
from vindicating the core propositions of neoliberalism, the recent economic history 
of East Asia, as well as global economic events and a burgeoning dissident literature, 
suggest otherwise. Indeed, there is a compelling case for East Asian policy-makers to 
re-affirm the faith in the many institutional variants of a mixed economy model rather 
than a universalistic ‘one-size-fits-all’ recipe for policy reform, even in the current 
‘augmented’ Washington consensus version. Furthermore, there is a persuasive case 
for East Asian policy-makers to collectively put their weight behind recent calls for 
the reform of global economic governance and enhanced regional cooperation. These, 
we argue, are necessary steps for creating an environment in which the crisis-affected 
economies of East Asia, in common with other developing countries, can craft their 
own distinctive and country-specific path to sustainable and equitable development.  
 
Neoliberalism in East Asia- A critique 
 
The consensus that was reached on understanding East Asian development and the 
lessons that one could draw from it broke down in the wake of the 1997 financial 
crisis.7 Pundits – most notably the IFIs which, on the very eve of the crisis, praised the 
East Asian economies for their ‘miraculous’ achievements - now rushed to condemn 
them as ‘failed’ cases of ‘crony capitalism’. What appeared to be close government-
business relations that were, in the past, argued to facilitate a virtuous process of 
equitable growth now became ‘corrupt’ regimes that encouraged inefficient state 
intervention, bred structural deficiencies and brought about their own downfall. The 
solution – crafted through the so-called ‘Letters of Intent’ that were negotiated 
between the IMF and the crisis-affected economies of Indonesia, Thailand and Korea 
– essentially called for a re-imposition of  ‘augmented’ Washington Consensus 
policies. In other words, the core policy proposals pertaining to macroeconomic 
prudence, deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation now had to be supplemented 
by a renewed commitment to poverty reduction and wide-ranging institutional reform 
that fell under the rubric of ‘good governance’.  As noted, Table 1 captures the 
essence of this ‘augmented’ version of the Washington consensus. Indeed, one could 
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argue that the attempt to reform the crisis-affected economies in East Asia simply 
became an experiment in re-inventing neoliberalism in the region. 
 
It is ironic that the attempt by the advocates of the Washington consensus to 
rehabilitate neoliberalism in East Asia is occurring at a juncture when there are 
considerable concerns about recent global and regional economic trends. It is ironic 
too that the attempt to forge a ‘new’ consensus on ‘best-practice’ norms in economic 
policy-making is coinciding with rising voices of dissent within the economics 
profession. Such dissidents question both the logic and the empirical validity of the 
proposition that a universalistic recipe of policy reform is the appropriate solution to 
re-ignite growth in the crisis-affected East Asian economies.   
 
The advocates of the Washington consensus claim that ‘…the best available evidence 
shows … the current wave of globalisation, which started around 1980, has actually 
promoted equality and reduced poverty’ [italics added] [Dollar and Kraay, 2002:1].  
Yet, these claims have to be juxtaposed with growing concerns about recent 
international and regional trends. Consider the following stylised facts.  
 
• Recent research shows that there has been a world-wide growth slow-down in 
the 1980s and 1990s vis-à-vis the 1960s and 1970s, despite some notable 
exceptions, such as China - see Milanovic [2002]; Weisbrot et al  [2000]; and 
Islam [2003]. 
 
• Some studies maintain that growth slow-down in developing countries is 
closely linked to growth slow-down in the OECD, rather than a deterioration 
in the policy environment of the average developing country [Easterly 2001]. 
 
• When China is excluded from the estimates, the 1990s show an increase in the 
absolute number in poverty across the world [UNDP, 2002: 18] 
 
• An UNCTAD [2002] study paints a grim picture of persistent and rising 
poverty among the least developed countries. 
 
• Serious concerns have been raised about the reliability of global statistics on 
poverty - see Deaton [2002] and Pogge and Reddy [2002]. 
 
• Some studies maintain that global inequality has gone up in the 1980s and 
1990s [Wade 2002a, 2002b;Milanovic, 2003],8although a lot depends on the 
particular dimension of global inequality that is being measured [Ghose 
[2001]. At the very least, one can infer that the evidence on trends in global 
inequality is contested. 
 
• A study based on 73 countries [representing 80 per cent of the world’s 
population] for which reliable data exists show an increase in inequality since 
the 1950s in 48 cases [Cornia and Court, 2001]. 
 
Indeed, there are conspicuous cases of regions in distress that go against the 
prescriptions of orthodoxy. Thus:  
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• Latin America represents a case of ‘reforms without results’. Despite decades 
of reforms, poverty in Latin America today is higher than in 1980, real wages 
are barely equal to 1980 and inequality remains persistent and conspicuously 
high.9 
 
• The attempt at ‘big-bang’ privatisation and fast-tracking of capitalism in the 
transition economies of Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union have turned 
out to be a tragic failure. The  ‘transition recessions’ have been longer and 
deeper than the Great Depression. GDP in 2000 was still below the 1990 level 
[by as much as 40 per cent] for many of these economies. Poverty and 
inequality have gone up sharply.10 
 
 
It can also be demonstrated that the empirical foundation on which some basic tenets 
of the Washington consensus rests – most notably trade liberalisation and 
macroeconomic conservatism – are quite fragile. As Rodrik [2001] has shown, the 
voluminous empirical literature on trade and growth conflate outcomes with policy 
variables. Trade volumes are outcomes of both trade and non-trade policies. A better 
approximation of trade policies is tariff and non-tariff barriers, compliance with WTO 
regulations and so forth. When tariffs, for example, are used in simple, cross-country 
regressions to ‘explain’ growth, no statistically significant result emerges. Indeed, the 
association seems to be positive, with higher economic growth being correlated with 
greater propensity to trade. This may simply be capturing the well-known historical 
pattern that many countries initially grow under relatively protected domestic 
markets. As they get richer, they begin to liberalise their trade regime.  
 
Recent studies that are sympathetic to the neoliberal ideas of the Washington 
Consensus have also failed to identify any meaningful impact of trade [as 
conventionally measured in terms of trade volume as a proportion of GDP] on both 
growth and poverty [as measured in terms of the average income of the poorest 20 per 
cent of the population]. For example, in a cross-country econometric study that 
received considerable publicity in the international media, Dollar and Kraay [2000] 
failed to demonstrate a statistically significant impact of trade performance of 
countries on the average income of the poor.11 A similar finding is reported in an IMF 
study [Ghura et al, 2002]. 
 
As is well known, the role of macroeconomic prudence in engendering national 
economic prosperity receives pride of place in the original version of the Washington 
Consensus [see Table 1]. Yet, the empirical evidence corroborating a link between 
macroeconomic conservatism [as reflected in fiscal prudence and the single-minded 
pursuit of low inflation], growth and poverty is tenuous. Based on the available 
literature and some estimates done by the authors [Islam 2003], one can highlight the 
following stylised facts. 
 
• Macroeconomic conservatism implicitly focuses on  ‘special cases’ because it 
is a story of the misfortunes that await countries if they engage in 
macroeconomic extremes.12 
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• Moderate rates of inflation are not harmful to growth. Inflation rates need to 
be quite high [in the 15 to 40 per cent range] before they become prejudicial to 
growth [Bruno and Easterly 1995]. 
 
 
• Studies using OECD data also show that countries that aimed for very low 
rates of inflation [0-3 per cent] do not necessarily exhibit either lower inflation 
or lower unemployment than countries that did not adopt inflation targeting 
[see, for example, Debelle et al 1998].  
 
• While some studies have demonstrated a statistical link between fiscal deficits 
and poor growth performance, others focusing on both poverty and growth 
have not been able to endorse the findings. More specifically, there is no 
statistical link between fiscal deficits and higher incidence of poverty [Dollar 
and Kray 2000]. 
 
• Some studies have demonstrated that inflation has a negative impact on the 
living standards of the poor, but the estimated elasticities are quite low and can 
be easily offset by countervailing factors. For example, a 1 per cent increase in 
inflation leads to a 0.01 per cent decline in the average income of the poor, but 
a 1 per cent increase in per capita GDP leads to a 0.94 per cent increase in the 
average income of the poor [Ghura et al 2002]. 
 
• While growth is a key determinant of the incidence of poverty, it can be offset 
by rising inequality [Ghura et al 2002]. Hence, what matters to poverty 
reduction is equitable growth rather than the single-minded pursuit of fiscal 
prudence or low inflation. 
 
• Cross-country econometric estimates are sensitive to the nature of the data [in 
terms of variations in time-periods and sample size] raising doubts about their 
credibility as a source of policy advice. There is no alternative to in-depth 
studies of the experiences of individual countries or a specific set of countries 
[Cashin et al 2001]. 
 
In sum, it is difficult to argue that the empirical foundation of global neoliberalism is 
so robust that one can confidently prescribe a ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy agenda for East 
Asia as well as other developing regions of the world. In any case, the view that the 
East Asian crisis was fundamentally driven by internal structural deficiencies that 
require large-scale reforms to rectify is highly contested. Stiglitz [2002] and others, 
such as the ADB-supported Asia Policy Forum [ADB, 2000], argue that the crisis-
affected economies of the region were, to a significant extent, the victims of 
instability in unfettered short-term capital flows.  
 
Even if post-crisis East Asia has to undertake a process of policy reform, does this 
mean that the ‘augmented’ Washington consensus offers the best guide? Dissident 
economists reject this option. Rodrik [2002a], for example, regards the ‘augmented 
Washington consensus’ as a fundamental misconception. The flawed nature of the 
augmented version of the Washington consensus stems from the fact that ‘…it is an 
impossibly broad, undifferentiated agenda of…reform’ [Rodrik 2002a:1]. It ends up 
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describing the desirable features of development but does not suggest a feasible way 
of getting there  
 
What about the renewed commitment to poverty and the notion that it should play a 
central role in national development strategies? One can hardly question the view that 
a renewed commitment to eradicating poverty lies at the core of engendering and 
sustaining development, especially for such developing East Asian economies as 
Indonesia and Thailand. Indeed, at a UN summit in September 2000, more than 180 
countries forged a consensus that the international community should commit itself to 
the attainment of target reductions in both the income and non-income dimensions of 
poverty by 2015 [using 1990 as the base].13 What is debatable, however, is the 
specific approach that the Bretton Woods institutions have taken in incorporating the 
idea that poverty reduction should play a central role in national development 
strategies in East Asia and elsewhere. These institutions are expected to play a leading 
role in the propagation of so-called ‘PRSPs’ or ‘poverty reduction strategy papers ‘ 
that developing countries must enunciate and implement through a nationally-owned, 
participatory process in order to gain access to development assistance. East Asian 
countries have not been immune to this new approach, with Indonesia releasing its 
‘interim’ PRSP in October 2002 and thus joining the ranks of about 70 countries that 
have done so. 
 
Critics of the PRSP maintain that the process will simply be dragged into a 
bureaucratic quagmire [Easterly, 2002]. Preliminary evaluations by the IMF and ILO 
of the ‘first generation’ PRSPs do not inspire much confidence. ILO [2002b] 
maintains in many countries employment concerns were not highlighted. The IMF 
evaluation [Ames et al 2002] notes that, in many countries, ‘…the PRSP process 
produced extensive lists of goals and … even longer lists of actions in support of 
those goals’. The authors of the review note that ‘…trade-offs and prioritisations are 
clearly needed if the strategy is to be realistic’. At the same time, the authors concede 
that ‘…the PRSP countries often find it difficult to set priorities in the face of 
uncertainties regarding their overall growth strategy, the cost of various actions and 
their own budget constraints’. They also highlight concerns of developing country 
governments that the ‘…procedures and reporting requirements associated with 
PRSP-lending operations remain overly demanding.’ Developing country 
representatives, both from the government and civil society, also ‘…pointed to 
continuing tensions between the principle of country ownership and the tendency of 
donors to promote issues of importance to themselves…’ The reviewers conclude 
that’…more information on aid commitments and more predictable aid flows would 
help low-income countries plan and implement their own strategies’ [Ames et al 
2002:3-4]. 
 
Resisting neoliberalism in East Asia 
 
Capitalism in East Asia is generally organised very differently from the apolitical 
idealisations found in much of the IFI’s prescriptive literature. Moreover, the specific 
patterns of business-government connections, corporate organisation, and broader 
social relations that are now routinely identified in the increasingly sophisticated and 
extensive comparative literature on East Asian political-economies,14 draw attention 
not just to their distinctiveness, but also to their durability. This is not surprising. The 
contingent institutional structures associated with political rule and business 
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organisation in East Asia not only provide a continuing template for social 
relationships, they are themselves an expression of earlier social and political 
accommodations [Beeson 2002]. Put differently, policy-making processes in 
particular and the determination of economic structures and relationships more 
generally have what Hall [1986: 5] describes as an inherent ‘institutional logic’ that 
effectively delimits the range of possible outcomes. In such circumstances, even if it 
could be determined that a policy paradigm was outdated, dysfunctional or otherwise 
inappropriate, it is entirely possible that institutional inertia will inhibit change 
[Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 3-30].  
 
The most important exemplar of this possibility is, of course, Japan. It is now 
commonplace to draw attention to the seeming exhaustion of the developmental state 
model in Japan, and to note the way in which former sources of competitive 
advantage have now become liabilities [Katz 1998]. The Japanese case does illustrate 
the way that institutionalised patterns of relationships can become self-serving and 
actually contribute to the very problems they are meant to address. And yet there are a 
number of important caveats that ought to be added to this picture of decline and 
institutional ossification. First, the Japanese developmental state has achieved its 
purpose in ways that other nations of the region have not, and, for many states in the 
region, an approximation of the development state may still offer the best way of 
overcoming the handicaps of ‘late’ development. Second, even if Japanese planners 
appear bereft of the ideas and authority necessary to turnaround Japan’s lacklustre 
economic performance, institutional inertia makes any radical change unlikely. Third, 
and perhaps most germane to this discussion, it is far from clear that the intellectual 
debate about the possible merits of neoliberal reform has been won in Japan. Not only 
are there still doubts about just how exhausted the Japanese model actually is 
[Fingleton 2002], but there has been a widespread sense of Schadenfreude 
amongst the Japanese about the troubles that are currently gripping the American 
economy [Ibison 2002]. The significance of such sentiments should not be 
underestimated, especially at the elite level, for as the controversy over the World 
Bank’s landmark analysis of the ‘Asian miracle’ reminds us, the struggle for contest 
to create the conventional wisdom is a deeply political process and dependent on the 
resources that can be deployed.15 Significantly, in the aftermath of the recent financial 
crisis when its leadership aspirations were abruptly undercut by the combined actions 
of the US and the IMF, Japan has finally begun to show signs of assuming the sort of 
regional leadership role its economic position dictates [Bowles 2002: 244-270]. 
 
Other countries, of course, do not have Japan’s economic weight or potential political 
leverage. Nevertheless, there are important examples of widespread resistance to 
neoliberal reform. The most consistent criticism has come from Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohammad.16 Admittedly, he is widely vilified in ‘the West’ and 
is tainted by his personal association with a repressive, authoritarian form of 
government. Despite these important reservations, one has to concede that he makes a 
number of points that have significant support across the region. Central to Mahathir’s 
critique of ‘the West’ generally and the IFIs in particular is his claim that the IFI 
‘favour the big and the financially rich corporations and discriminate against the small 
and poor businesses from developing countries. So the dice is [sic] loaded against the 
poor developing countries’ [Mahathir 2003]. Mahathir believes that only the 
collective actions of developing countries are likely to provide a bulwark against 
neoliberal hegemony. Although his government may have had powerful incentives to 
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resist a neoliberal reform agenda that implicitly threatens the interlocking patterns of 
political and economic power underpinning his administration [Beeson 2000: 335-51], 
it is also important to recognise that his views have a sympathetic audience in the 
region. 
 
 
Beyond neoliberalism in East Asia 
 
Tinkering with an ‘augmented Washington consensus’ in East Asia and elsewhere is 
unlikely to yield a novel and pragmatic alternative to neoliberalism. What, then, is the 
way forward? One should start from the premise that the broad principles of 
mainstream economics, rather than the particular prescriptions of neoliberalism, are 
relevant in guiding economic development. This means that one cannot retreat to the 
state activism of the past or uncritically embrace its modern equivalent, the street 
protests underpinning the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement that erupted in Seattle and 
elsewhere.17 This means too that one cannot condone East Asian-style governance of 
the past entailing attenuation of human rights and the corrupt nature of ‘crony 
capitalism’. Whether or not non-democratic regimes and so-called close government-
business relations unleashed a virtuous cycle of growth will always remain debatable. 
What is clear is that, in a new international environment in which there is a low 
degree of tolerance for both corruption and abuse of human rights, the policy-makers 
of East Asia in the post-crisis era will have to make a fresh start.  
 
In making a fresh start, policymakers in East Asia should espouse the broad principles 
of mainstream economics that allow scope for institutional eclecticism. In other 
words, it is necessary to move away from the formulaic principles that drove the 
Washington Consensus and rediscover the virtues of a mixed economy model with its 
many institutional variants.18 This means that both states and markets have critical 
roles to play in economic development. The appropriate combination of the two varies 
over time and across countries. Hence, it is necessary to devise context-specific 
approaches to deal with problems of poverty, inequality and sustainable development.  
 
East Asian policymakers should also recognise that there is likely to be a trade-off 
between the imperatives of globalisation and domestic democratic politics. When they 
gear their entire national development strategy to the preferences and sentiments of 
global markets – often subsumed under the rubric of attracting and sustaining investor 
confidence – they may be forced to shun the voices and concerns of domestic 
constituencies and the strategic directions that a nation ought to take. This 
inadvertently undermines democratic governance and may well cause the tensions 
between domestic stakeholders and foreign constituencies to become unmanageable. 
Under such circumstances, crafting a credible national development strategy becomes 
rather difficult.19 
 
Despite the commendable attempts that the IFIs have made in recent years to improve 
transparency and accountability in their operations and decisions, a growing number 
of influential voices are now arguing that, to remain at the forefront of development 
policy and practice, institutions of global economic governance, most notably the 
IFIs, must confront their impaired legitimacy.20 The thesis of impaired legitimacy 
starts from the premise that the prevailing ownership structure of the IFIs, in which 
rich countries are disproportionately favoured by the current voting formula, creates 
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powerful incentives for the G-7 nations, and the US in particular, to pursue their 
commercial and national interests often at the expense of the interests of developing 
countries. This pursuit of self -interest is usually cloaked in the language of the 
Washington Consensus, suggesting that there is a universally agreed set of ideas on 
what constitutes a national development agenda. One solution, some argue, lies in 
changing the voting formula so that the developing countries have more influence 
over the IFIs. Yet another is to disband the durable, but entirely undemocratic, 
practice whereby the head of the World Bank is chosen by the US and the head of 
IMF is chosen by the North Western European nations.  
 
Others have argued that that there should be clear separation between policy analyses, 
research and the operational activities of the IFIs by ensuring that the former are 
carried out by independent agencies. Currently, the research departments are located 
within these institutions, creating the risk that some of the politically sensitive policy-
oriented research could be used to justify the operational imperatives of the World 
Bank and IMF.21 Critics maintain that it is through the lending operations and 
‘country assistance strategies’ that the largest shareholders of the two institutions seek 
to exercise their strategic influence. While it is easy to dismiss the above proposals as 
too contentious and hence unlikely to be ever seriously considered by the international 
community, what is clear is the need to move away from an artificial consensus on 
global policy issues. It is necessary to nourish the spirit of eclecticism and intellectual 
diversity anchored in the idea of country-specific approaches to development in the 
post-crisis era.   
 
The papers in this collection indicate that the countries of the region have responded 
to the neoliberal agenda in a variety of ways, reminding us of the continuing capacity 
states have to mediate external influences [Weiss 2003]. What is most striking in the 
aftermath of the East Asian economic crisis, however, is the increasing desire to 
create regional mechanisms capable of responding to long-run structural changes in 
the international economy and the IFI-sponsored political interventions that 
accompany them. Whatever else the crisis revealed, it demonstrated the region’s 
collective vulnerability to externally-generated economic forces, and to extra-regional 
political actors that sought to manage them. In such circumstances, it is revealing that 
there have been a series of major regional initiatives to develop monetary mechanisms 
like the proposed Asian Monetary Fund [AMF] to insulate the region from damaging 
economic forces, and political initiatives like ‘ASEAN+3’ to provide a counter-
weight to the overweening influence of the US and the IFIs [Webber 2001: 339-372]. 
The idea was first mooted with the onset of the 1997 financial crisis in East Asia and 
took the form of a proposed Asian Monetary Fund [AMF] to supplement the 
financing facilities available through the IMF. The proposal was shot down by the 
IMF, European Union and the United States on the ground that it would duplicate the 
activities of the IMF and that a regional body along the lines of the AMF would lack 
the political will to ask member countries to undertake unpopular adjustment 
measures to cope with macroeconomic crises. Recent developments suggest that the 
idea of a regional financial architecture to supplement conventional multilateral 
arrangements is emerging with renewed vigour [see Rana, 2002]. 
 
Concluding remarks 
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Crafting pragmatic alternatives to neoliberalism that will facilitate pro-poor, 
employment-friendly development agenda at the national level will require an 
environment in which developing countries in East Asia and elsewhere can harness an 
increased inflow of external resources to meet national development goals through 
both aid and access to export markets of the rich nations. Access to such markets 
depends not just on dismantling trade barriers by both rich and poor countries, but 
also on the ability of the developed world to create the necessary demand for 
developing country exports. This means fostering and sustaining buoyant domestic 
markets in the industrialised countries – a task that surely belongs to the domain of 
macroeconomic policy. After all, a key lesson is that the growth slow-down in the 
developing world in the 1980s and 1990s is linked to the growth slow-down in the 
OECD [Easterly 2001]. Trade flows would have to be complemented by appropriate 
aid flows. Current calculations suggest that annual flows of development assistance 
will have to double from present annual flows of US$40 to 56 billion if the world 
community wishes to make a credible commitment to financing the Millennium 
Development Goals [UNDP [2002:31]. At the same time, renewed efforts will have to 
be made in ensuring that the available quantum of aid is allocated to priority areas that 
directly affect growth, employment creation, and poverty. The rich nations of the 
world have to make a commitment to ‘development-friendly’ policies. Currently, the 
rich economies that matter in development cooperation – such as the United States – 
compare very unfavourably with the generosity of such small European nations as 
Denmark and the Netherlands.22 
 
And yet this alternative agenda is unlikely to be realised. Such outcomes would 
require extensive international cooperation and the existence of states with the 
capacity to effectively implement more expansionary and ‘development-friendly’ 
policies. Not only are the IFIs unlikely to support such initiatives, but the distinctive 
and central role played by the region’s interventionist, developmental states is actively 
discouraged by neoliberal reforms. In such circumstances, if the states of East Asia 
are to create an environment in which continuing economic development is feasible, 
they may have to pursue nationally  or regionally-based strategies that either reject or 
deflect some of the key elements of the neoliberal reform package. The danger, of 
course, is that such a project will simply be a mechanism for propping up or 
legitimating incompetent or corrupt administrations. The challenge for the region, in 
short, is to revitalise some of the former strengths of the development state without 
succumbing to cronyism and inefficiency, while simultaneously warding off 
inappropriate reformist pressures from the IFIs. This is likely to be the defining policy 
challenge for East Asian political elites in the twenty-first century. 
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Table 1: Re-inventing neoliberalism: the ‘augmented’ Washington Consensus 
Washington Consensus  
[the original ten] 
Augmented Washington Consensus 
[original ten plus…] 
 
 
 
1. Fiscal discipline 11. Central bank independence and 
inflation targeting 
2. Redirection of public expenditure 
towards basic education, primary 
health care, infrastructure 
12. Reform of both public sector and 
private sector governance  
3. Tax reform 13. Flexible labour markets 
4. Interest rate liberalisation 14.  WTO agreements and harmonisation 
of national standards with international 
standards in business and finance, but 
with exceptions [most notably 
environment and labour] 
5. Competitive exchange rate 15. Strengthening national financial 
systems to facilitate eventual capital 
account liberalisation 
6. Trade liberalisation 16. Sustainable development 
7. Liberalisation of FDI flows 17. Protecting the vulnerable through 
safety nets 
8. Privatisation 18. Poverty reduction strategy [PRSP and 
[PRSF ] 
9. Deregulation 19. Country ownership of policy agenda 
10. Secure property rights 20. Democratic participation 
  
Note: this is an amended version of a suggested interpretation offered by Rodrik 
[2002a: 10]. PRSP = poverty reduction strategy papers; PRSF = poverty reduction 
strategy framework. The left-side column of the table is based on Williamson [1999]. 
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1 For the causes and implications of the spectacular collapse of such iconic US companies as Enron and 
Global Crossing, see Philips [2002]. 
2 The tragedy of the transition economies in Eastern Europe and the case of ‘reforms without results’ in 
Latin America are highlighted at a later stage in the paper, as is the global evidence on growth, 
inequality and poverty.  
3 For prominent examples of this analytical tradition, see Lal [1983], Bauer [1972,1984] and Krueger 
[1974, 1990]. 
4 Even if there were to be a paradigm shift in East Asia and a more enthusiastic embrace of neoliberal 
ideas, that are major potential constraints on the ability of many governments in the region to 
implement such policies as they lack the governmental capacities and the rich infrastructure of private 
sector organisations that are fundamental to neoliberal governance in Western Europe. See Beeson 
[2001: 481-502]. 
5 Williamson [1999] has lamented the fact that both reputable economists and populist commentators 
have abused his conception of the term ‘Washington Consensus’. He argues that he never intended it to 
become a synonym for ‘neoliberalism’ or ‘market fundamentalism’. He developed the term within the 
specific context of Latin America as the region struggled to come to terms with the debt crisis of the 
1980s. The paper defends the use of Washington Consensus as a good approximation of the neoliberal 
consensus in the developing world. It draws on the rationale offered by Kanbur [1999] that, despite the 
subtleties embedded in the original intent of Williamson, critics of the Washington Consensus judged 
what they saw in practice. Kanbur maintains that practitioners from the BrettonWoods institutions used 
the notion of the Consensus to adopt an aggressive negotiating stance with (recalcitrant) developing 
countries.  
6 Rodrik [2001] coined the term the ‘augmented Washington consensus’, while Stiglitz [1998] talked 
about a ‘post-Washington consensus’. He seems to have moved away from that idea in subsequent 
work. 
7 See Islam and Chowdhury [2000, Chapter 1] for a discussion of the emergence of the ‘consensus’ on 
the nature and causes of rapid growth in pre-crisis East Asia. 
8 Dowrick and Akmal [2003] suggest no discernible change in inequality, after correcting for ‘biases’ 
in current measurement of world distribution of income. 
9 See IDB [1997] and Equidad [2000]. See also Lustig and Arias [2000]. Updates are offered in ILO 
[2002a]  
10 See World Bank [2002], Stiglitz [1999] and Kolodko [1999]. Cohen [2000] provides a fascinating 
account of how the US media under the Clinton administration ignored – or at least downplayed - the 
social costs of the project of fast-tracking capitalism in Eastern Europe. 
11 Dollar and Kraay [2000]. Milanovic [2002] notes that the Dollar and Kraay findings were 
enthusiastically embraced by such influential publications as the Economist and the Financial Times 
and made no attempt to convey the tenuous nature of the empirical evidence. 
12 Cross-country data show that the majority of developing countries are not fiscally profligate nor are 
they prone to high inflation. See Islam [2003]. 
13 OECD [1996] is the precursor to the Millennium Development Goals.  
14 For a example, see Whitley [1999]; Hall and Soskice [2001]. 
15 The World Bank’s [1993] seminal report was the subject of significant intellectual contestation 
between the US and Japan – the latter determined to have the role and possible advantages of the 
developmental state approach it pioneered acknowledged in a way that IFI publications had not 
previously dome. See Wade [1996: 3-36]. 
16 Thailand under Thaksin is also a good example of an East Asian-style resistance to the neoliberal 
agenda. Hewison discusses the Thai experience in some detail in this volume. 
17 The street protests that spearheaded the current ‘anti-globalisation movement’ first emerged in 
spectacular fashion in December, 1999 and scuttled the WTO meeting in Seattle. Amartya Sen [2001] 
makes the important point that, by raising ‘global doubts’, the current ‘anti-globalisation movement’ 
may be forcing the international community to seek ‘global solutions’.  It is thus counter-productive to 
dismiss the anti-globalisation movement as the product of a ruffian fringe that the world’s intellectual 
sages and political leaders ought to stand up against.  
18 See Kuttner [1997] for an elegant statement for the case of the eclectic mixed economy model.  
19 Rodrik [2002b] makes this argument forcefully.  
20 See, for example, UNDP [2002]. See also Stiglitz [2002]. Williamson [2000] offers a comprehensive 
guide to reform proposals pertaining to the IMF, while Pincus and Winters [2002] examine the ‘re-
 22
                                                                                                                                            
invention of the World Bank’. Kapur [2002] offers a critique of G-7 proposals to reform the 
‘multilateral development banks’ [MDBs].  
21 Deaton [2002], Kanbur [2002] and Wade [2002b] make these suggestions.  
22 An innovative ranking of 21 rich nations were carried out by the Washington-based Center for 
Global Development [CGD] and the well-known journal Foreign Policy [FP] in terms of their 
commitment to development in areas of aid disbursement, trade policy, environmental policy, foreign 
investment in developing countries and support for peace-keeping operations in conflict-ridden areas of 
the world. The United States and Japan languish at the bottom of this league table. See [CGD/FP, 
2003]. 
 
 
 
